THE PLACE OF SKEPTICISM IN EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

EBUA JARVIS EBUA
Abstract

Vital, in epistemology, is the concept of ‘certainty’ which is closely linked to justified belief. This has placed contemporary epistemology at a cross road, given the controversy that surrounds the possibility of obtaining knowledge of the external world that is reliable and justified. Rene Descartes in his first meditation talking of reliable and justified beliefs postulated what is today known as “Cartesian skepticism”, which is the view that knowledge (or justified belief about) something external is impossible. Barry Stroud sees these views as conflicting, and adopts what he calls meta epistemological dilemma. “Meta-epistemological skepticism” is a term that is used for a variety of skeptical positions in contemporary epistemology. Stroud divides and uses “meta-epistemological skepticism” into those that (a) pick out a certain set of meta-epistemological challenges to a range of anti-skeptical theories (particularly responses to skepticism from epistemic externalism), or those that (b) pick out a certain set of meta-epistemological theses about the problem of radical skepticism. Meta epistemological skepticism challenge is associated with meta-epistemological skepticism that an intellectually satisfying explanation of how knowledge of the external world is possible (or how justified belief about the external world is possible) which needs to meet certain tenets epistemically. This raises the problem if it is possible for a theory to meet these epistemic tenets needed for a skeptic view to be able to justify knowledge? This paper questions the place of skepticism in justifying belief (knowledge). It seeks to bring out the shortcoming of scepticism with regards to epistemic justification. Barry Stroud rejects the main doctrine of transcendental idealism. What is at stake against the skeptic is the metaphysical point of view about the world that has to underlie any anti- skeptical proof, to repel transcendental idealism means to displace the basis on which alone Kant construes his anti-sceptical position. A historic- critical method was implore to examine the place of skepticism in epistemic justification. Consisting of in depth analysis, and examination on the possibility of using skepticism and if it is possible to justify knowledge without some aspects of transcendental idealism, while depending soling on the five external senses. The result obtained demonstrate some gaps in Descartes Skepticism. Nevertheless, Barry Stroud meta-epistemological dilemma provides tenets for any theory of knowledge which can either be skepticism or will not be fully general theory.

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